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Abstract 
We apply a model of an environmentally differentiated duopoly to the analysis of environmental 
policy in the form of a subsidy/tax on consumers based on emission levels of products. More 
specifically, we consider environmental and welfare effects of subsidizing consumers who 
purchase environmental-friendly goods such as hybrid vehicles. Focusing on types of market 
coverage by heterogeneous consumers, we examine the issue in the cases of a Bertrand and a 
Cournot duopoly. In the case of full market coverage with a Bertrand duopoly, an environmental 
subsidy improves the environment and is socially optimal. However, in the case of partial 
market coverage, irrespective of mode of competition, the optimal policy depends on the 
magnitude of the marginal social valuation of environmental damage. That is, if the marginal 
social valuation of environmental damage is sufficiently large (small), an environmental tax 
(subsidy) is optimal. Furthermore, in the Bertrand duopoly case, the effect of subsidy on the 
environment is ambiguous, whereas in the Cournot duopoly case, the subsidy degrades the 
environment. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A growing demand for environmental care has been observed. That is, recently, consumers 
purchase goods and services that are environment-friendly or produced with environment- 
friendly techniques. There is also sufficient evidence to suggest that firms are aware of 
consumers’ behavior in this regard, and that they invest funds in environment-friendly goods, 
product lines and facilities. Governments in many advanced countries also regulate polluting 
emissions, environmental waste, and global warming using various environmental policies, 
including taxes/subsidies, emission standards, tradable emission permits, and eco-labeling, 
amongst others. Moreover, even local governments in many advanced countries, e.g., the Tokyo 
Metropolitan Government, the Osaka Prefectural Government, and others, are currently 
addressing environmental problems such as air pollution. 
Previously, many seminal works in the field of environmental economics (Baumol and 
Oates, 1988, and others) have primarily dealt with polluting wastes or environmental effluents 
which are the by-products of production process, such as those found in chemical industries. 
Accordingly, they have mostly considered environmental policies associated with producers. In 
this paper, however, we focus on products with environmental characteristics in a green market 
where effluents and noises are the by-products of consumption of heterogeneous ‘consumers’ 
who differ in terms of their willingness to pay for the products according to a product’s 
environmental quality.1 For example, from the point of view of the life cycle of manufacturing 
products such as vehicles, the volume of CO2 gas produced in the process of consumption is 
likely to be larger than that in the process of production. Furthermore, the environmental 
damage caused by the polluting wastes and effluents associated with consumption of the 
products seems to be external for individual consumers, i.e., environmental negative 
externalities. However, some consumers who are very conscious of environmental degradation 
may purchase an environment-friendly product, even if its price is substantially higher than that 
of an environment-unfriendly product, while other consumers who are not concerned about the 
environment may purchase a lower priced product, even if it is environment-unfriendly. That is, 
consumers differ in their degree of consciousness about the environment (Scherhorn, 1993). For 
example, in the context of car exhaust fumes, the emission level of a hybrid engine motor 
vehicle such as a Toyota Prius is much lower than that of a wholly gasoline engine motor 
                                                     
1 In this paper, ‘consumers’ not only implies households driving cars but also companies using 
vehicles for transportation. In a sense, ‘consumers’ are ‘users’ of environmentally differentiated 
products. 
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vehicle. Hence, consumers who care about the environment may prefer the hybrid vehicle, 
whereas others do not. In addition, more extreme environmentalists may not purchase any type 
of car, but instead would ride a bicycle or use public transportation such as a train (Kahn, 2007). 
A number of papers employ a model of vertically differentiated products to examine 
environmental subsidy/tax policies with heterogeneous consumers. Cremer et al. (1998, 2003) 
theoretically and empirically analyze the optimal tax design in the presence of environmental 
externalities. In realty, governments in many advanced countries allocate tax credits, i.e., a kind 
of subsidy, to consumers who purchase environment-friendly goods. For example, in Japan the 
Ministry of the Environment enforces a taxation courtesy system for the introduction of low-
emission vehicles. That is, owners of an eco-car receive tax credits, while owners of diesel 
vehicles incur heavier taxes. Furthermore, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government encourages 
owners of small-sized companies to purchase low-emission vehicles through the provision of 
subsidies and financing.2 
The purpose of this paper is to examine how emission regulations by subsidies/taxes levied 
on consumers and/or producers of an environment-friendly good, i.e., a cleaner product, affect 
the environment and social welfare, by applying the model of environmentally differentiated 
products presented by Moraga-González and Pandrón-Fumero (2002). We address this issue in 
the cases of a Bertrand and a Cournot duopoly, focusing on types of market coverage by 
heterogeneous consumers. That is, we deal with the full market coverage type, in which all 
consumers in the market necessarily purchase either product, and the partial market coverage 
type, in which some consumers do not purchase any products in the market. 
A number of previous studies are closely related to the analysis undertaken here. Bansal and 
Gangopadhyay (2003) examine ad valorem commodity subsidies/taxes on environmentally 
differentiated products in the case of a Bertrand duopoly with partial market coverage.3 They 
show that discriminating commodity subsidy policy is welfare-superior to discriminating 
commodity tax policy. However, they did not analyze the Cournot duopoly case. Also, in the 
context of the linkage between tariff policy and the environment, Toshimitsu (2008) analyzes 
                                                     
2 On the environmental policy of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, see 
 http://www.metro.tokyo.jp/ENGLISH/POLICY/environment.htm 
Furthermore, on recent studies of air pollution regulation in urban transportation, for example, 
see Nash et al. (2001), Proost and Van Dender (2001), Ferrara (2007), Parry (2007).  
3  Bansal and Gangopadhyay’s (2003) model is related to Cremer and Thisse’s (1999) 
endogenous quality choice model used to analyze an ad valorem commodity tax/subsidy policy 
in oligopolistic price competition with full market coverage. However, it is assumed in the 
model of Cremer and Thisse that a firm incurs marginal costs of production as an increasing 
function of its quality level. 
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how ad valorem import tariffs levied on a cleaner and a dirtier product affect the environment 
and welfare in the cases of a Bertrand and a Cournot duopoly with partial market coverage. He 
finds that the effect of an ad valorem tariff policy on the environment and welfare depends on 
the mode of competition and the degree of social valuation of environmental damage. As shown 
below, we deal with an environmental subsidy/tax policy with consumers and/or a firm, 
associated with the difference in the emission levels of products, but not a commodity 
subsidy/tax policy, in the cases of a Bertrand and a Cournot duopoly. 
Lombardini-Riipinen (2005) considers a mixed policy with a uniform ad valorem 
commodity tax and an emission (or environmental) subsidy/tax with full market coverage, 
assuming that a firm incurs marginal costs of production as an increasing function of its 
abatement efforts. He discusses the impact of optimal first-best policies in the context, including 
ad valorem commodity or emission taxes on firms, or ad valorem commodity taxes on firms and 
emission subsidies on consumers. In addition, he argues that the second-best subsidy for 
consumers and the second-best emission tax on a firm should be set equal to the marginal social 
value of the environmental damage. 
Although our model is closely related to Lombardini-Riipinen (2005), we instead assume a 
fixed cost associated with a unit emission level, i.e., environmental quality, and analyze both 
types of full and partial market coverage. In addition, we mainly address a second-best 
environmental subsidy/tax policy with consumers and/or a firm in cases of a Bertrand and a 
Cournot duopoly. Furthermore, if we discuss a mixed policy with a commodity tax/subsidy and 
an emission tax/subsidy, we should consider that the government authority choosing a 
commodity tax might not necessarily be identical to the authority choosing an emission (or 
environmental) tax. For example, in Japan, responsibility for the former falls under the control 
of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, whereas the Ministry of the Environment 
administers the latter. Although the analysis of potentially conflicting choices of different 
authorities within a government is an interesting issue, it can also be complex. Therefore, in this 
paper, we deal with the environmental subsidy/tax policy of a single government. 
The remainder of this paper comprises the following three sections. Section 2 sets the basic 
model. Section 3 examines the effect of environmental subsidies on aggregate emissions and 
social welfare in the case of full market coverage with a Bertrand duopoly. We show that an 
environmental subsidy is socially optimal. Furthermore, in the cases of partial market coverage 
with a Bertrand and a Cournot duopoly, we show that the optimal policy depends on the 
magnitude of the marginal social valuation of environmental damage, regardless of the mode of 
competition. Finally, Section 4 summarizes the results and raises some outstanding issues. 
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2. The Model 
 
(a) Market and Demands 
We begin by describing a green market in which consumers have heterogeneous preferences for 
the quality of environmentally differentiated products. That is, a continuum of heterogeneous 
consumers exists who differ in their marginal valuations θ  of the green features of products. To 
simplify, we assume that the consumer-matching value is uniformly distributed with density one 
and falls in the range [ ].,0 θθ ∈  That is, consumer θ  close to )0(θ  is very sensitive 
(insensitive) to the environmental qualities of products.  
Let e  denote the observable unit emission level associated with the product )( .,0 ∞∈e  
Without losing generality, we assume that firm C (D) supplies a cleaner (dirtier) product with a 
per unit emission of Ce  ( De ) at a price of Cp  ( Dp ) and .0>≥ CD ee  A consumer purchases 
at most either one or zero unit of the product. Hence, the surplus of consumer θ  who acquires 
the variant e  at a price of p  is given by4: 
},0,max{ dSpevu +−−= θ                                                                                    (1) 
where v  is the intrinsic utility obtained from a single unit of the product, irrespective of the 
variant’s unit emission level, and d  is a dummy variable with 1=d  if Cee =  and 0=d  if 
.Dee =  Furthermore, )( CD eesS −=  is a subsidy paid to the consumer purchasing a cleaner 
product. If ,0<s  then the government levies emission taxes on the consumer. 
Because we focus on how an environmental subsidy/tax policy has an impact on the 
behavior of firm C producing a cleaner product, let us normalize the unit emission level of a 
dirtier product to unity: 1=De  and .1≤= εCe  
We now consider the demands for the environmentally differentiated products. The index of 
                                                     
4 The utility function as in (1) implies that individual consumers do not consider environmental 
damage to the whole economy such as acid rain, global warming, and air pollution, but are 
sensitive to the environmental qualities of the relevant products. However, we introduce the 
social valuation of environmental damage into the utility function of an individual consumer as 
follows: }.,max{ EEdSpevu γγθ −−+−−=  Hence, consumers who do not purchase any 
products in the market only suffer from environmental damage caused by aggregate emissions. 
Thus, the reservation utility is expressed as ,Eγ−  not zero. Regardless, our results are not 
substantially changed. 
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the marginal consumer who is indifferent between the surplus given by purchasing a dirtier and 
a cleaner product is characterized by .
1
~ spp DC −
−
−
=
ε
θ  Furthermore, the index of the marginal 
consumer who is indifferent between the surplus given by purchasing a cleaner product and 
nothing is characterized by 
ε
εθ )1(ˆ −+−= spv C . Thus, consumer θ  falling into θθ ~0 <≤  
)ˆ~( θθθ <<   purchases a dirtier (cleaner) product. Accordingly, there exist two types of the 
market if the following conditions hold. 
Case FMC:  Full market coverage, if .ˆ θθ ≥  
Case PMC:  Partial market coverage, if .ˆ θθ <  
With respect to Case FMC, if v  is sufficiently large, consumers are willing to pay, even for 
a dirtier product. This is because the direct intrinsic utility is large enough to compensate for the 
loss of utility caused by emissions of the product. Thus, the type of full market coverage holds. 
This is where all consumers necessarily purchase either product. In this case, let Dq  represent 
the quantity demanded for a dirtier product. Given a uniform distribution, demand is given by 
.~θ=Dq  Also, the quantity demanded for a cleaner product is given by .
~θθ −=Cq  Therefore, 
the direct demand functions are given by: 
 sPPq DCD −
−
−
=
ε1
 and .
1 ε
θ
−
−
−+= DCC
PPsq                                                        (2) 
Because the corresponding inverse demand functions are not derived from (2), we do not deal 
with the case of full market coverage with a Cournot duopoly. 
On the other hand, with regard to Case PMC, consumer θ  falling into θθθ ≤<ˆ  does not 
purchase anything in the market. The condition holds if v  is not large. That is, consumers are 
not willing to pay, even for a cleaner product, because the direct intrinsic utility is not large 
enough to compensate for the loss of utility caused by emissions of the product. Therefore, in 
the case of PCM, the direct demand functions for both products are given by: 
 sPPq DCD −
−
−
=
ε1
 and .
)1(
)1(
εεε
εε sPPvq DCC +
−
+−−
=                                             (3) 
Furthermore, in view of (3), the corresponding inverse demand functions are given by: 
 CDD qqvp ε−−=  and ).1()( εε −++−= sqqvp CDC                                        (4) 
 
(b) Firms and Profits 
Let us explain the firms producing the products in the market. The firms have to decide on a 
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unit emission level, i.e., environmental quality, of the product before competition in price or in 
quantity. That is, they invest in environmental research and development (R&D) or build a 
product line associated with the environmental qualities. As discussed earlier, because we focus 
on the decision of a unit emission level by firm C, we assume that the cost function is given by: 
),(εCC FF =  ,0)( <
′ εCF .0)( ≥
″ εCF  We also assume that the cost of firm D is constant with 
respect to the unit emission level: ).1(DD FF =  Furthermore, for simplicity, the marginal costs 
of production are independent of a unit emission level, and assumed to be zero.  
We assume that the government subsidizes firm C an amount of )1( εσ −=Σ  per output in 
order to help firm C produce a much cleaner product. If ,0<σ  then the government levies 
emission taxes on firm C. Therefore, the profit functions of the firms are expressed by: 
DDDD Fqp −=Π  and ).()( εCCCC Fqp −Σ+=Π  
 
(c) Government and Social Welfare 
We proceed to the composition of social welfare. First, aggregate emissions that cause 
environmental degradation are expressed as: 
 .CD qqE ε+=                                                                                                              (5) 
Second, under the full market coverage type, aggregate consumer surplus is expressed as: 
.)}1({)( ~
~
0 CCDD
qpdsvqpdvCS −−+−+−−= ∫∫ θεεθθθ θθθ                             (6) 
Furthermore, because there are three kinds of consumers under the partial market coverage type, 
aggregate consumer surplus can be represented by: 
.0)}1({)(
ˆ
~
~
0
+−−+−+−−= ∫∫ CCDD qpdsvqpdvCS θεεθθθ θθθ                        (7) 
Third, the producer surplus that implies aggregate industrial profits is expressed as: 
.CDPS Π+Π=                                                                                                          (8) 
Therefore, given (5), (6) or (7), and (8), the net social surplus included in the social 
valuation of the environmental damage is defined by: 
 ,Ω−+−≡ PSECSW γ                                                                                              (9) 
where )0(≥γ  denotes the marginal social valuation of environmental damage. 
Furthermore, CC qsqS )1)(()( εσ −+=Σ+=Ω  represents incurred budget deficits of the 
government subsidizing consumers and firm C. 
Here we should consider the characteristics of the government. That is, it is plausible for a 
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central government such as the Japanese government to determine environmental 
subsidies/taxes to maximize the net social surplus given by (9). However, suppose, for example, 
that the consumers are Tokyo residents, but the firms are not located in Tokyo; rather, they are in 
Osaka or abroad. In this case, the purpose of the local government such as the Tokyo 
Metropolitan Government is to maximize the net social welfare of the Tokyo residents 
represented by .C
L SqECSW −−≡ γ  
Accordingly, the local government would decide the optimal subsidies with the residential 
consumers, but might never subsidize firm C. This is because the local government, as well as 
the residents, would not bear the burden of the lump-sum tax needed to subsidize the firm. Thus, 
we are able to assume that the local government determines an environmental subsidy/tax on the 
residential consumers to maximize ,LW  whereas the central government decides an 
environmental subsidy/tax on firm C to maximize (9). However, as mentioned earlier, we do not 
consider the issues of policy games of an environmental subsidy/tax between local and central 
governments and of policy conflict or cooperation between them. Therefore, in what follows, 
we deal with an environmental subsidy/tax policy of a single government maximizing the net 
social surplus given by (9). 
We present a three-stage game as follows. In the first stage, the government subsidizes/taxes 
consumers and/or firm C. In the second stage, firm C decides a unit emission level of the 
product, given the subsidy/tax. In the final stage, the firms compete in price or in quantity in the 
market, given the subsidy/tax and the unit emission level. The solution of this game is the 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.  
 
 
3. The Effects of Environmental Subsidy/Tax Policy 
 
3.1 The Full Market Coverage Type 
Because the derivation of the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in the final stage is simple, we only 
present the equilibrium outcomes as follows. 
3
)}(){1( σθε +−−
=
spD  and .3
)22)(1( σθε −+−
=
spC                                (10) 
Substituting (10) into (2), the equilibrium quantities are given by: 
3
)( σθ +−
=
sqD  and ,3
)(2 σθ ++
=
sqC                                                            (11) 
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where ,0<
∂
∂
−=
∂
∂
ωω
CD qq .,σω s=  That is, the subsidy has an impact on market share between 
the products. Furthermore, an increase in the unit emission level of a cleaner product reduces 
prices, but does not affect quantities.  
In the second stage, the first-order profit maximization condition for firm C is given by: 
,0
9
)2( 2
=
∂
∂
−
++
−=
∂
Π∂
ε
σθ
ε
CC Fs                                                                       (12) 
where the second-order condition always holds. We consider the effect of an environmental 
subsidy on a unit emission level: 
.,,0)(0)(
2
22
2
σω
ωεε
ωε
ω
ε s
d
d C
C
C
=≤>
∂∂
Π∂
⇔≤>
∂Π∂
∂∂Π∂
−=                                     (13) 
Given the right-hand side expression in (13), we derive 
( ) .0
9
222
<
++
−=
∂∂
Π∂ σθ
ωε
sC  Thus, 
we have .,,0 σω
ω
ε s
d
d
=<  That is, an environmental subsidy policy with consumers and/or 
firm C reduces a unit emission level of a cleaner product. 
In order to analyze welfare effects of an environmental subsidy/tax policy, we first examine 
the effect on aggregate emissions. By substituting (11) into (5), aggregate emissions are given 
by: 
{ }.
3
))(1()21( σεθε +−−+
=
sE                                                                            (14) 
Because it holds that ,0
3
1
<
−
−=
∂
∂ ε
ω
E
 ,0>=
∂
∂
Cq
E
ε
 and ,0<
∂
∂
ω
ε
 we obtain 
.,,0 σω
ω
ε
εωω
sEE
d
dE
=<
∂
∂
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
=                                                                           (15) 
In view of (15), an environmental subsidy reduces aggregate emissions in the case of full 
market coverage. Put differently, given a unit emission level of a cleaner product in the short-
run, some consumers change from purchasing a dirtier product to purchasing a cleaner product 
by a subsidy. In the long-run, firm C reduces the unit emission level of the product, with even a 
subsidy for consumers as well as a subsidy for itself. 
Second, we examine the effect on aggregate consumer surplus given by (6). The direct effect 
is given by .0)2(
3
1
>+
−
=
∂
∂
CD qq
CS ε
ω
As the indirect effect is ,)(
2
1 2
CD qq
CS
−=
∂
∂ θ
ε
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however, the sign is not unidirectional. For example, it holds that .0lim 0 >∂
∂
→ εω
CS
 But, if 
,2.0)533()( θθωθ ≈−≥>  we obtain .0≤
∂
∂
ε
CS
 Thus, unless an environmental subsidy is 
sufficiently large, the effect on aggregate consumer surplus is given by .,,0 σω
ω
s
d
dCS
=>  
Third, with regard to the effect on producer surplus, we obtain: 
{ } 0)(2
3
)1(2
>++
−
=
∂
∂
σθε
ω
sPS and .0
9
)}({ 2
<
+−
−=
∂
Π∂
=
∂
∂ σθ
εε
sPS D  
Given ,0<
∂
∂
ω
ε
 the sign of the effect on producer surplus is positive, .,,0 σω
ω
s
d
dPS
=>  Thus, 
an environmental subsidy increases producer surplus. 
Fourth, we should consider the effect on the government’s budget deficit. We derive 
0
3
)]([2)1( >⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ ++
−=
∂
Ω∂ σθ
ε
ω
s
 and  .0)( <+−=
∂
Ω∂
Cqs σε
 Thus, given ,0<
∂
∂
ω
ε
 an 
environmental subsidy increases the budget deficit, i.e., .,,0 σω
ω
s
d
d
=>
Ω
  
Taking the results derived above into account, we conclude that an environmental subsidy 
policy is socially optimal under the full market coverage type. 
 
3.2 The Partial Market Coverage Type 
3.2.1 The Bertrand Duopoly Case 
With respect to the partial market coverage type, in which there are some consumers not 
purchasing any products, we need to confirm the results under the full market coverage type 
shown earlier.  
We can easily derive the equilibrium prices in the final stage as follows: 
ε
σε
−
+−−
=
4
)}(){1( svpD  and .4
}2)2(2){1(
ε
σεε
−
−−+−
=
svpC                     (16) 
Given (16), subsidizing firm C reduces the prices of both products, whereas subsidizing 
consumers raises the price of a cleaner product, but decreases that of a dirtier product. 
Substituting (16) into (3), the equilibrium quantities are given by: 
ε
σ
−
+−
=
4
)(svqD  and ,)4(
))(2(2
εε
σε
−
+−+
=
svqC                                                  (17) 
 - 11 -
where 0>
∂
∂
ε
Dq , 0<
∂
∂
ε
Cq , ,0<
∂
∂
ω
Dq and .,,0 σω
ω
sqC =>
∂
∂
 Because a decrease in the unit 
emission level of a cleaner product infers an increase in environmental quality, it increases 
(reduces) the quantity demanded of a cleaner (dirtier) product. Furthermore, it is clear that a 
subsidy with consumers and/or firm C increases (reduces) the quantity demanded of a cleaner 
(dirtier) product. Hence, the magnitude of the effect of subsidizing consumers on the quantity 
demanded is equal to that of subsidizing firm C.  
In the second stage, firm C chooses the unit emission level of the product to maximize 
profits. The first-order profit maximization condition for firm C is given by: 
,0)1(2)21( =
∂
∂
−⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
∂
∂
−+−=
∂
Π∂
εε
εεε
ε
CC
CC
C Fqqq                                             (18) 
where { } .0<•  Assuming the second-order condition is satisfied, we derive the effect of an 
environmental subsidy on the unit emission level: 
.,,0)(0)(
2
22
2
σω
ωεε
ωε
ω
ε s
d
d C
C
C
=≤>
∂∂
Π∂
⇔≤>
∂Π∂
∂∂Π∂
−=                                     (19) 
We calculate the right-hand side expression in (19) as follows. 
{ } .0
)4(
)48)(1(2))(810(6
)4(
)2(2
2
2
2
3
2
<
−
+−−
−++−+
−
−
−=
∂∂
Π∂
C
C qsv
εε
εεε
σεε
εε
ε
ωε
 
Thus, we have .0<
ω
ε
d
d
 That is, an environmental subsidy with consumers and/or firm C 
reduces the unit emission level of a cleaner product. 
In order to analyze aggregate industrial profits afterward, we here present the effect of a 
decrease in the unit emission level of a cleaner product on the profit of firm D: 
.0)(
4
2 2 <
−
+
−=
∂
Π∂
D
D q
ε
ε
ε
                                                                                     (20) 
In view of (20), a decrease in the unit emission level of a cleaner product extends the degree of 
differentiation between the environmental qualities of the products. This, in turn, mitigates price 
competition. Thus, an environmental subsidy increases the profits of firm D because it reduces 
the unit emission level of a cleaner product. 
We are now in a position to examine the effect of an environmental subsidy/tax policy on 
social welfare. First, substituting (17) into (5), we obtain aggregate emissions in the partial 
market coverage type 
.
4
))(1(3
ε
σε
−
+−+
=
svE                                                                                           (21) 
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Let us use the effect on aggregate emissions expressed as  .,, σω
ω
ε
εωω
sEE
d
dE
=
∂
∂
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
=  
The first term on the right-hand side is the direct effect of an environmental subsidy, where the 
sign is positive, i.e., .0
4
1
>
−
−
=
∂
∂
ε
ε
ω
E
 A subsidy policy directly increases aggregate emissions. 
Put differently, given the unit emission level in the short-run, the subsidy increases the quantity 
demanded of a cleaner product more than it reduces the quantity demanded of a dirtier product. 
This implies that some consumers, who would not buy any products in the market without the 
subsidy, purchase the product due to the improvement in environmental quality brought about 
by the subsidy. Thus, a subsidy directly or in the short-run degrades the environment. However, 
the second term on the right-hand side expresses the indirect effect of the change in the unit 
emission level. The sign of the indirect effect is negative, as 0
4
3
>
−
=
∂
∂
Dq
E
εε
 and .0<
∂
∂
ω
ε
 
Thus, in the long-run, the subsidy reduces aggregate emissions. Consequently, the total effect of 
an environmental subsidy policy on aggregate emissions is ambiguous. If the magnitude of the 
indirect (or long-run) effect is larger than that of the direct (or short-run) effect, an 
environmental subsidy decreases aggregate emissions. Otherwise, it increases them. 
Second, we consider the effect of an environmental subsidy on aggregate consumer surplus 
in (7). Hence, the effect can be expressed by .,, σω
ω
ε
εωω
sCSCS
d
dCS
=
∂
∂
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
=  With respect 
to the first term on the right-hand side, the sign of the direct effect on aggregate consumer 
surplus is positive, as .0)2(
4
1
>+
−
−
=
∂
∂
CD qq
CS
ε
ε
ω
 However, as to the indirect effect in the 
second term, we obtain .
2
)(
4
})2(3{ 2CCDD qqqqCS
−
−
++
=
∂
∂
ε
ε
ε
 The sign of the equation is not 
necessarily negative. For example, it holds that .0lim 1 >∂
∂
→ εε
CS
 But, if ,
5
4≤ε  then we 
obtain .0<
∂
∂
ε
CS
 It may not be intuitively unusual to assume that the sign of the effect on 
aggregate consumer surplus is negative when the environmental quality of a cleaner product 
deteriorates. Thus, an environmental subsidy increases aggregate consumer surplus. 
Third, with regard to the effect of the subsidy policy on producer surplus, we obtain 
{ } 0
)4(
48)2(
4
)1(2
22
2
>
−
+−
+−−
−
−
=
∂
∂
εε
εε
ε
ε
ε
ω DC
qqPS  and .
εε ∂
Π∂
=
∂
∂ DPS  Thus, taking 0<
∂
∂
ω
ε
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and (20) into account, we obtain .,,0 σω
ω
ε
εωω
sPSPS
d
dPS
=>
∂
∂
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
=  As a result, an 
environmental subsidy increases producer surplus. In particular, we note that subsidizing 
consumers increases the quantity demanded of a cleaner product and extends the difference in 
emission levels of both products. Given (20), this leads to an increase in profits of both firms. 
Fourth, we should consider the effect of an environmental subsidy on the government’s 
budget deficit, .)1)(( Cqs εσ −+=Ω  We derive the followings: 
,0
)4(
))(2()1( >⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
−
+−
+−=
∂
Ω∂
εε
σε
ε
ω
sqC  and 
.0
)4(
)])(48()2(4)[1()( 22
2
<
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
−
++−+−−
++−=
∂
Ω∂
εε
σεεεε
σ
ε
svqs C  
Thus, taking (19) into account, an environmental subsidy increases the budget deficit, i.e., 
.,,0 σω
ω
ε
εωω
s
d
d
=>
∂
∂
∂
Ω∂
+
∂
Ω∂
=
Ω
                                                              
Using the results derived above, we are able to consider an optimal environmental 
subsidy/tax policy in the case of the partial market coverage model. As already shown, the 
welfare effects of subsiding consumers are equivalent to those of subsidizing firm C. 
Accordingly, we mainly address hereafter the optimal environmental subsidy/tax policy with 
consumers, i.e., .s=ω  
The key point is the effect on aggregate emissions. If an environmental subsidy reduces 
aggregate emissions, i.e., ,0<
ds
dE
 we can easily conclude that an environmental subsidy with 
consumers is the optimal policy. However, if the magnitude of the direct effect on aggregate 
emissions is significantly larger than that of the indirect effect, it holds that  .0>
ds
dE
 That is, an 
environmental subsidy increases aggregate emissions, and thus degrades the environment. 
Hence, if the marginal social valuation γ  is sufficiently large, i.e., ,*B
ds
dE
ds
dPS
ds
dCS
γγ ≡
+
>  
because the government gives much weight to the environment, then an environmental tax with 
consumers is the optimal policy. Otherwise, i.e. ,*Bγγ <  an environmental subsidy is socially 
optimal. 
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3.2.2 The Cournot Duopoly Case 
To address whether the mode of competition affects the effects of an environmental subsidy/tax 
policy on the environment and social welfare, we consider the above issues in the case of a 
Cournot duopoly by following the same procedure as in the previous subsections.  
Because the derivation of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the final stage is simple, we 
present the equilibrium outcomes: 
ε
σε
−
+−−
=
4
))(1( svqD  and ,)4(
))(1(2)2(
εε
σεε
−
+−+−
=
svqC                             (22) 
where 0>
∂
∂
ε
Dq , 0<
∂
∂
ε
Cq , ,0<
∂
∂
ω
Dq  ,0>
∂
∂
ω
Cq  and .,,0
2
σω
ωε
sqC =<
∂∂
∂
 
In the second stage, the first-order profit maximization for firm C is given by: 
,02 =
∂
∂
−⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
∂
∂
+=
∂
Π∂
εε
ε
ε
CC
CC
C Fqqq  
where { } .0<•  We assume that the second-order condition is satisfied. Furthermore, the cross 
derivative is given by: 
,022
22
<
∂∂
∂
+⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
=
∂∂
Π∂
ωε
ε
ε
ε
ωωε
C
C
C
C
CC qqqqq  
where { } .0<•  Thus, the effect of an environmental subsidy on a unit emission level is 
.,,022
2
σω
ε
ωε
ω
ε s
d
d
C
C
=<
∂Π∂
∂∂Π∂
−=                                                                         (23) 
That is, an environmental subsidy with consumers and/or firm C reduces the unit emission level 
of a cleaner product. 
Now, we proceed to the analysis of the effect of an environmental subsidy/tax policy on 
social welfare. First, substituting (22) into (5), we obtain aggregate emissions as follows. 
.
4
))(1(
ε
σε
−
++−
=
svE                                                                                             (24) 
Given (24), we have: .0
4
1
>
−
−
=
∂
∂
ε
ε
ω
E
 and .0
)4(
)}(3{
2 <
−
++
−=
∂
∂
ε
σ
ε
svE
 Furthermore, taking 
into account ,0<
∂
∂
ω
ε
 paradoxically, an environmental subsidy increases aggregate emissions, 
i.e., .,,0 σω
ω
s
d
dE
=>  That is, the subsidy directly increases aggregate emissions, as 
mentioned in the case of a Bertrand duopoly. In addition, as to the indirect effect, the subsidy 
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policy reduces the unit emission level of a cleaner product, whereas it sufficiently increases 
market share of the product. In this case, an increase in the market share of a cleaner product 
leads to an increase in aggregate emissions.  
Under the partial market coverage type, as mentioned earlier, an environmental subsidy 
policy not only raises the environmental quality of a cleaner product, but also increases the 
willingness to pay for the products of consumers, who would never purchase any products 
without the policy. That is, some consumers would change from taking public transportation 
such as trains to driving hybrid vehicles because of the environmental subsidy on the latter. 
Second, the effect of an environmental subsidy on aggregate consumer surplus is expressed 
as .,, σω
ω
ε
εωω
sCSCS
d
dCS
=
∂
∂
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
=  Hence, we derive 0
4
})22({ 2
>
−
+−+
=
∂
∂
ε
εε
ω
CD qqCS  
and 
{ }{ } .0
2
)(
4
)2()( 2
<−
−
−+++
−=
∂
∂ CCDD qqqsqCS
ε
εσ
ε
Given (23), an environmental 
subsidy necessarily increases aggregate consumer surplus. 
Third, as to the effect on producer surplus, we obtain 
0
4
)2)(1(2
>
−
−−
=
∂
∂
ε
ε
ω
DC qqPS  and .02 >
∂
∂
=
∂
Π∂
=
∂
∂
εεε
D
D
D qqPS  
The second equation implies that improving the environmental quality of a cleaner product 
reduces the profits of firm D. Given (23), the sign of the effect on producer surplus, 
,,, σω
ω
ε
εωω
sPSPS
d
dPS
=
∂
∂
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
=  is not unidirectional. Put differently, if the magnitude of the 
direct effect is larger (smaller) than the magnitude of the indirect effect, an environmental 
subsidy increases (decreases) producer surplus. 
Fourth, as to the effect of an environmental subsidy on the government’s budget deficit, we 
obtain the followings. 
,0)(
)4(
)1(2)1( >⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
+
−
−
+−=
∂
Ω∂
σ
εε
ε
ε
ω
sqC  and 
.0
)4(
)])(24(2)48)[(1()( 22
22
<
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
−
++−++−−
++−=
∂
Ω∂
εε
σεεεεε
σ
ε
svqs C  
Thus, given (23), an environmental subsidy increases the budget deficit, i.e., .,,0 σω
ω
s
d
d
=>
Ω
 
Suppose that the government places much weight on the environment. If the marginal social 
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valuation is substantially large, ,*C
ds
dE
ds
dPS
ds
dCS
γγ ≡
+
>  then an environmental subsidy 
directed to consumers is not socially optimal. In other words, the government should charge 
consumers environmental taxes to reduce consumption of the products, even thought the unit 
emission level of a cleaner product rises. Conversely, if the government does not consider the 
environment as its priority, i.e., ,*Cγγ <  an environmental subsidy is an optimal policy.  
Therefore, in view of the analysis in 3.2.1 and 3.2.2, we conclude that, under the partial 
market coverage type, regardless of the mode of competition, if the marginal social valuation of 
environmental damage is sufficiently large, then an environmental tax directed at consumers is 
socially optimal. Otherwise, an environmental subsidy is the optimal policy. 
 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
We have analyzed how an environmental subsidy/tax policy associated with consumers and/or a 
producer of an environmental-friendly (cleaner) product has impacts on the environment and 
social welfare, and examined whether the environmental subsidy policy is socially optimal with 
regard to a Bertrand and a Cournot duopoly, looking at two types of market coverage. 
 
Our results are as follows. 
(i) The effects on the environment and social welfare of subsidizing consumers purchasing a 
cleaner product are equivalent to those of subsidizing the firm producing it.  
(ii) An environmental subsidy reduces aggregate emissions in the case of full coverage 
market with a Bertrand duopoly, whereas it increases them in the case of partial coverage 
market with a Cournot duopoly. Also, in the case of partial coverage market with a Bertrand 
duopoly, the effect of environmental subsidy on aggregate emissions is ambiguous. 
(iii) An environmental subsidy policy is socially optimal in the case of full coverage market 
with a Bertrand duopoly.  
(iv) An environmental subsidy (tax) policy is socially optimal in the case of partial coverage 
market, regardless of the mode of competition, if the marginal social valuation of 
environmental damages is sufficiently small (large, respectively).  
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Let us now discuss some outstanding issues. First, as mentioned in the Introduction, an 
interesting issue arises in the form of an environmental subsidy/tax policy game between local 
and central governments. For example, the local government decides an environmental 
subsidy/tax for consumers by taking into account the welfare improvements for residential 
consumers included in the valuation of the environment in the local area. However, the central 
government chooses an environmental subsidy/tax for firms to maximize social welfare 
included in aggregate industry profits. In this case, as discussed by Lombardini-Riipinen (2005) 
regarding a commodity tax policy, we can analyze the policy mix, e.g., an environmental 
subsidy/tax and a commodity tax. Second, we should discuss other environmental policies using 
direct pollution controls, such as emission standards and quotas, as well as indirect pollution 
controls, such as tradable emission permits, emission and/or commodity taxes. For example, in 
future work we intend to address how emission taxes on an environment-unfriendly polluting 
good, i.e., a dirtier product, affect the environment and social welfare by employing a similar 
model to that presented in this paper. Hence, we need to examine whether the effects of 
environmental subsidies, i.e., carrots, on a cleaner product are equivalent to those of emission 
taxes, i.e., sticks, on a dirtier product. 
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